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If the child turns 18 while still a full-time high school student, the duty to pay support continues until the child completes the 12th grade or turns 19, whichever occurs first. (Cal. Fam. Code § 3901(a)(1) (2022).) Parents also have the responsibility to continue to support a child of any age who is unable to earn a living. (Cal. Fam. Code § 3910 (2022).)
Three months before the child's 19th birthday, the state child support agency will send a notice that child support will end unless a custodial parent or adult child submits proof (before the 19th birthday) that the child is enrolled as a full time student or has been accepted (and plans to attend in the next semester) as a full-time student to a college or university. (Haw. Rev. Stat. §§ 576E-14 580-47; 584-18 (2022).)
The age of majority in Iowa is 18. (Iowa Code § 599.1 (2022).) The duty to pay child support generally ends when the child turns 18. (Iowa Code § 252A.3 (2022).) A judge may order support to continue until age 19 if the child is between the ages of 18 and 19, attending high school full time, and is reasonably expected to complete high school before turning 19. (Iowa Code § 252A.3 (2022).)
The age of majority in Louisiana is 18. (La. Civ. Code Art. 29 (2022).) The duty to pay support generally ends at 18, but continues if the child is a full-time student in good-standing, enrolled in secondary school or equivalent, has not reached age 19, and is dependent upon either parent. (La. Rev. Stat. § 9:315.22(C) (2022).)
The age of majority in Michigan is 18. (Mich. Comp. Laws § 722.52 (2022).) The duty to pay support generally ends at age 18, but judges may order postmajority support for children who are attending high school full time and have a reasonable expectation of graduating. The support duty may continue until the child reaches 19 years and six months of age.
The age of majority in Mississippi is 21. (Miss. Code § 1-3-27 (2022).) The duty to pay child support generally ends when the child turns 21, unless the child is emancipated through marriage, serving in the military on a full-time basis, or serving a sentence of two or more years for committing a felony. (Miss. Code § 93-11-65(8)(a) (2022).)
The age of majority in South Dakota is 18. (S.D. Codified Laws § 26-1-1 (2022).) The duty to pay child support generally ends when the child turns 18, or when the child turns 19 if the child is a full-time student in a secondary school. (S.D. Codified Laws § 25-5-18.1 (2022).)
The age of majority in Virginia is 18. (Va. Code § 1-204 (2022).) The duty to pay child support generally ends when the child turns 18, but it will continue until either graduation or when the child turns 19 when the child is a full-time high school student, isn't self-supporting, and is living in the custodial parent's home. (Va. Code §§ 20-60.3; 20-124.2 (2022).)
Colo. Rev. Stat. § 11-33-126 (LexisNexis). ["Compliance with federal requirements - due diligence"]Colo. Rev. Stat. § 16-13-701 (Westlaw). ["Reports related to seizures and forfeitures--legislative declaration--definitions"]Colo. Rev. Stat. § 16-15-102 (Westlaw). ["Ex parte order authorizing the interception of wire, oral, or electronic communications"]Colo. Rev. Stat. § 16-21-103 (LexisNexis). ["Information on offenders required - duties of law enforcement agencies - court"]Colo. Rev. Stat. § 19-2-205 (LexisNexis). ["Facility directors - duties"]Colo. Rev. Stat. § 19-2-508 (LexisNexis). ["Detention and shelter - hearing - time limits - findings - review - confinement with adult offenders - restrictions"]Colo. Rev. Stat. § 22-1-120 (LexisNexis). ["Rights of free expression for public school students"]Colo. Rev. Stat. § 22-7-604.5 (LexisNexis). ["Alternative education campuses - criteria - application - rule-making - definition"]Colo. Rev. Stat. § 22-25-103 (LexisNexis). ["Definitions:" Colorado Comprehensive Health Education Act]Colo. Rev. Stat. § 22-25-104.5 (LexisNexis). ["Law-related education program - creation"]Colo. Rev. Stat. § 22-31-109.1 (LexisNexis). ["Board of education - specific powers and duties - safe school plan - conduct and discipline code - safe school reporting requirements - school response framework - school resource officers - definitions - repeal"]Colo. Rev. Stat. § 24-33.5-412 (LexisNexis). ["Functions of bureau - legislative review - interagency cooperation with reporting functions - processing time for criminal history record checks - computer crime - synthetic cannabinoids enforcement"]Colo. Rev. Stat. § 24-33.5-415.3 (LexisNexis). [Colorado Bureau of Investigation: "Information on gangs - legislative declaration"]Colo. Rev. Stat. § 24-33.5-1617 (Westlaw). ["Law enforcement, public safety, and criminal justice information sharing grant program--rules--fund created--definitions--repeal"]
M.E. v. Board of Educ., No. 99CV3, 1999 WL 1532375, at *1 (W.D.N.C. Dec. 17, 1999). Plaintiffs claimed that the Individualized Education Program (IEP) the Buncombe County Board of Education (Board) proposed for C.E. denied him the free appropriate public education to which he was entitled under the IDEA, 20 U.S.C. 1401(a)(18), and that the Board failed to provide plaintiffs with the requisite notice. The district court granted summary judgment for the defendant Board, finding that plaintiffs had failed to request a due process hearing within 60 days of the contested action as required by the North Carolina Administrative Procedure Act, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 150B-23, and therefore could not challenge the IEP in court. M.E., 1999 WL 1532375, at *6.
On July 29, 1997, the parents wrote again to the Board suggesting that the Board avoid a costly due process hearing by providing reimbursement for the Lovaas therapy the parents had provided C.E. at their expense. Id. at *2. The Board's attorney responded by letter dated August 7, 1997, that the school board would not pay the full amount requested and that any amount would have to be approved by the school board. The letter stated: "You, of course, have the right to file a due process petition at any time, however, the reality of school systems requires that the governing board be consulted and that process takes time." Id. at *3. The letter did not explain the Board's reasons for rejecting the parents' proposed IEP for the period when C.E. was eligible for services. Nor did the letter explain the basis for the IEP the Board instead implemented during that same period. The letter also did not contain a statement of the procedural safeguards provided under the IDEA except for noting that the IDEA, a copy of which was enclosed, was reauthorized in June 1997 and contains "new notice provisions and provisions regarding attorney's fees". Ibid. The Board's attorney sent the parents another letter on August 8, 1997, rejecting the request for full payment and making a counter-offer.(2)
The district court erred in dismissing plaintiffs' claims under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), 20 U.S.C. 1400 et seq. In enacting the IDEA, Congress intended to ensure that school districts provide children with disabilities a free appropriate public education and that parents have a full and informed opportunity to contest placement decisions. These purposes were thwarted by the Board's failure here to provide the written notice the IDEA requires, 20 U.S.C. 1415(b)(1)(C); 34 C.F.R. 300.504-505, and by the district court's decision finding the plaintiffs' request for a due process decision untimely, in spite of the absence of a final written notice. The district court also failed to consider the purposes of the IDEA when it erroneously determined that North Carolina's 60-day statute of limitations applicable to state administrative actions can be appropriately applied to a request for a due process hearing under the IDEA. ARGUMENT
In enacting the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), 20 U.S.C. 1400 et seq., Congress sought to ensure "that all children with disabilities have available to them * * * a free appropriate public education" and to ensure "that the rights of children with disabilities and their parents or guardians are protected." 20 U.S.C. 1400(c). To fulfill those purposes, Congress enacted procedural safeguards providing for administrative and judicial review of state and local educational agency decisions regarding special education services. See 20 U.S.C. 1415. The statutory scheme emphasizes the role of the parents or guardians in the special education decision-making process and guarantees their right to contest the decisions of the state and local educational agencies that they feel may not serve the best interests of their child. See, e.g., 20 U.S.C. 1415(b)(1)(E); 20 U.S.C. 1415(b)(2); see also Board. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 205 (1982) (procedures emphasize parental participation "at every stage of the administrative process").
Under the IDEA's notice provisions in effect at the time of the events at issue here, a local educational agency such as the school board here was required to provide "written prior notice to the parents * * * whenever [it] (i) proposes to initiate or change, or (ii) refuses to initiate or change, the identification, evaluation, or educational placement of the child or the provision of a free appropriate public education to the child." 20 U.S.C. 1415(b)(1)(C). The written notice, which is critical to informed parental participation in the IDEA process, must include:
This Court has found the written notice requirement to be a "most important" procedural provision under the Act, noting that it "requires advance written notice of all procedures available under the section * * *." Hall v. Vance County Bd. of Educ., 774 F.2d 629, 634 (4th Cir. 1985) (considering the written notice provisions of the Education of the Handicapped Act (EHA),(5) 20 U.S.C. 1415(b)(1)(C)-(D)); see also Board of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 205-206 (1982) ("Congress placed every bit as much emphasis upon compliance with procedures giving parents and guardians a large measure of participation at every stage of the administrative process, see, e.g., §§ 1415(a)-(d), as it did upon the measurement of the resulting IEP against a substantive standard"). A school board's failure to comply with the IDEA's written notice provision deprives a child of a "free appropriate education" when the failure "actually interfere[s] with the provision of free appropriate public education." Gadsby, 109 F.3d at 956, citing Hall, 774 F.2d at 635. 2b1af7f3a8